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NOTES
The risk theory requires a careful analysis of the duty, provides for
the application of significant public policy considerations, and affords
a convenient means for a clear, understandable instruction to the jury.
These advantages make Cardozo's approach not only desirable but neces-
sary to an intelligible explanation of the basis of determination in negli-
gence actions. Courts have employed the risk theory in decisions concern-
ing manufacturers' liability, statutorily imposed fault, and even in some
early common negligence cases. Judges have been applying the risk an-
alysis of duty under the foreseeability test of causation making them a
part of Indiana law; proximate cause language of these opinions serves
only to veil and confuse the critical issues. Since proper use of the risk
theory leaves nothing to be considered under the element of proximate
cause, the judiciary should abandon the language of the causation con-
cept and clearly adopt Judge Cardozo's rationale.
PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE PURCHASERS' INABILITY TO
BARGAIN OVER LIFE INSURANCE
Recent criticism of the insurance industry has not been aimed at
either the financial practices or management of the companies but rather
at the product sold, the insurance policy.' Basically this is due to a pre-
vailing dissatisfaction with certain results accruing when contract law is
applied to the policy.' The field of life insurance contains many examples
of these unsatisfactory results. Although each instance is a complete
problem in itself, they are, when viewed together, illustrative of the
larger issue.
The law of misrepresentation has an important position in present
day life insurance litigation. It owes its prominence, in a large sense, to
judicial and legislative dissatisfaction with the results obtained when the
strict common law doctrine of warranties was applied to life insurance
contracts.' Today, the statutes of most states provide that all statements
since the consequences were not unnatural. By the definition of the risks to be per-
ceived, the court answered the issue of proximate cause.
1. "Generally, the criticism which is aimed at insurance is not criticism with respect
to financial matters or management. It is criticism of the product which insurance com-
panies sell. . . . This condition of affairs has been developing for two hundred years or
more. It grows worse instead of better ... " Shaver, Pitfalls in Insurance Policies,
[1950] INS. LJ. 801, 802.
2. The policy of insurance is a contract between the parties and is governed by the
principles of contract law. 1 FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW oF INSURANCE §1 (5th
ed. 1952).
3. The application by the early courts of the strict doctrine of warranties to the life
insurance policy resulted in widespread hardships for the insured. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON
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made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed representa-
tions rather than warranties." However, in most jurisdictions a material
false representation will void the policy, even though innocently made by
the insured.' In the ordinary insurance purchasing situation, in which
the insured fills out a lengthy and complex application prepared by the
company, the possibilities of a negligent false statement are numerous.
For this reason, the courts have, in many cases, gone to great lengths to
avoid forfeitures of policies because of a misrepresentation.' Thus,
representations are construed liberally in favor of the insured and need be
only substantially true.7 Some courts even require knowledge by the in-
sured of the falsity of the statement before they will void the policy.8
The doctrine of concealment as applied in insurance law, differing
from that in contract jurisprudence, has also been severely criticized.' The
Restatement of Contracts defines concealment as an affirmative act, such
as covering up a material defect."0 In insurance law, however, according
to the strict marine rule, concealment includes mere nondisclosure of a
material fact.1 The doctrine has been somewhat modified in life and
fire insurance by requiring that such omissions be "fraudulent,"" but the
THE LAW OF INSURANCE §74 (3d ed. Anderson, 1951). A warranty is characterized by the
fact that it must be strictly and absolutely complied with. A mere misstatement of an
immaterial and trivial fact made in good faith by the insured is sufficient to void the
policy under this doctrine. Id. §71. With the adoption by many states of the "entire con-
tract" statutes, e.g., NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW §142, statements made by the insured in
the application also became part of the contract and under strict common law rules would
be warranties. Due to the imposition of hardships in many cases, the courts began to
avoid such results by liberal construction in favor of the insured. 2 FREEDMAN, RICHARDS
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE §319 (5th ed. 1952).
4. NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW §142; IND. ANN. STAT. §394206a(5) (Burns Repl.
1952). There are similar statutes in twenty-five other states. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF
INSURANCE LAW §83 (1935).
5. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 493 (6th ed. 1945) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §67.
6. See Harnett, Misrepresentation in Life Insurance Applications: An Analysis of
the Kansas Law and a Proposal for Reform, 17 KAN. B.J. 214 (1948).
7. See Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 (U.S. 1871). VANCE, op. Cit. supra
note 3, §70.
8. Metropolitan Life Insurance -Co. v. Burno, 309 Mass. 7, 33 N.E.2d 519 (1941).
There have also been numerous dicta to the effect that the statement, to void the
policy, must be made with fraudulent intent. VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §67 n.13. See
also Prosser, Innocent Misrepresentations of Health in Insurance Applications, 28 MINN.
L. REv. 141 (1944).
9. Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law of Insurance, 15
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 391 (1950).
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §471, comment f (1932). See also RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION §8, comment b (1937).
11. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 587 (2d ed. 1947).
12. "The non marine rule . . .has four prerequisites: (1) The insured knew the
fact; (2) The insured did not disclose the fact to the insurer, and the insurer was not
chargeable with its knowledge; (3) The fact was material; (4) The insured knew the
fact was material." Harnett, supra note 9, at 403. See also AMRHEIN, LIBERALIZATION
OF THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 129 (1933) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §61 n.12.
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determination of fraud involves numerous difficulties. It is open to
question as to whether the insured need only know the materiality of the
concealed fact or if in addition an actual intent to deceive is required to
render the policy voidable."3 It has been suggested that this doctrine no
longer serves a useful purpose and that adoption of the ordinary contract
law definition would be beneficial. 4
Some of the problems arising through the application of the doctrines
of misrepresentation and concealment have been substantially mitigated
by the adoption in many states of statutes requiring incontestable clauses.
Under these provisions, after a specified amount of time has elapsed
(usually two years), the insurance company cannot contest the policy ex-
cept for nonpayment of premiums." However, in the interim before
the clause becomes effective, these doctrines are still applicable.
The effect and interpretation of exclusionary clauses are quite im-
portant to the life insurance purchaser for they are found in most policies
and preclude recovery if death occurs under certain circumstances." If
the insured knows of the exclusions or never participates in the prescribed
13. "It [the nonmarine rule as to concealment] requires the insured's knowledge of
the fact and nondisclosure of the fact to the insurer who is not chargeable with its
knowledge and materiality. But in addition, the nondisclosure must have been in bad
faith. The meaning of this last requirement is muddy in the very best tradition of empty
legal verbalisms. Some courts tell us the disclosure must be fraudulent, others say there
must be an actual intent to deceive. Then others rush in to say that a reasonable man
would have known the fact was material, and that therefore the insurer's defense of con-
cealment is effective." Harnett, supra note 9, at 402.
14. Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, [1954] INs. L.J. 151, 161. See
also, Comment, Life Insurance Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-Binding Binder 63
YALE L.J. 523 (1954).
15. This clause was voluntarily adopted by some companies and has subsequently
been required by statute in many states. E.g., NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW §155; IND.
ANN. STAT. §39-4206a(3) (Burns Repl. 1952). The basic effect of this clause is to give
the company a reasonable time to determine the veracity of the insured's representations,
while also declaring a time limit after which the beneficiary may be confident of re-
covery in case of death. VANcE, op. cit. supra note 3, §97. See Keesling, The Ubiquitous
Incontestable Clause, [1928] LEGAL SECTION, Am. LIFE CoNy. 229; Shield, A New Look
at the Incontestable Clause, 9 Ass'N OF LmF INS. COUNSEL 23 (1952).
16. Exclusions contained in life policies are usually of two kinds: those waived
upon the payment of an extra premium, and those which void the policy in case of viola-
tion. The former include restrictions as to disease, occupation, residence, travel, war
service, and aviation; the latter include voiding of the policy in case of suicide, dueling,
violation of the law, death as punishment for crime. Although early policies were filled
with restrictions and exclusions, modern policies have relatively few.
The basic exclusion clauses may now be said to include: suicide, military service, and
aviation. Some states regulate these exclusions by statute (e.g., NEW YoIc INSURANCE
LAW §155). However, the law is not clear as to the exact meaning or application of many
exclusions.
Concerning the aviation exclusion clause, see KRUEGER, T3E LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
CONTRACT 309-310 (1953) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §100.
Concerning the war exclusion clause, see KRUEGER, loc. cit. supra at 319-333; VANCE,
op. cit. supra note 3, §101; Billings, Of War Clauses, [1952] INs. LJ. 793; Goldstein, The
War Clause in Life Insurance Contracts, [1953] INs. L.J. 458; Wheeler, The War Clause,
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activities, the insurance is probably adequate. However, in the event of
his decease difficulties may arise when the beneficiaries discover that
recovery is barred because the insured, unaware of the exclusion, met
death in a manner not covered by the policy. In an effort to mitigate the
ofttimes harsh results of these provisions, some courts have adopted the
rather tenuous position that an incontestable clause overrides any exclu-
sions and creates an absolute assurance of the benefit free from any dis-
pute of fact except that of death.1 7  Although the majority view is to the
contrary, s these minority opinions tending toward a more than liberal
construction in favor of the insured indicate a further attempt by the
courts to accomplish by questionable means what they feel to be just results.
Another unsettled problem in life insurance is that of who should
bear the risk of loss during the interim between the application for in-
surance and the delivery of the policy-the company or the insured.
Under strict contract law the policy is not effective until delivered to the
insured.1" However, when a loss occurs during this period, the courts
have sought to reach just results by varied interpretations." Recovery
has been allowed on a tort theory for the company's delay in acting on
the application21 and, occasionally, upon contract principles.22 The use of
a binding receipt on the part of the companies has often served to further
confuse the issue. By such a receipt the company, in consideration of
payment of the first premium, purports to extend coverage before delivery
of the policy. However, due to the multiplicity of forms used, and pos-
sibly the different factual situations in which the question has arisen, the
[1953] INs. L.J. 727.
Concerning the suicide clause, see KRUEGER, loc. cit. supra, at 294-307; VAN cE, op. Cit.
supra note 3, §95; Fallon, Coverage and Suicide in Life Insurance, [1953] INs. L.J. 811.
17. Mr. Justice Holmes has stated: "The object of the [incontestable] clause is
plain and laudible-to create an absolute assurance of the benefit, as free as may be from
any dispute of fact except the fact of death ... " Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 101-2 (1920).
18. The leading case is Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449,
169 N.E. 642 (1930), which is followed in a majority of jurisdictions. VANCE, op. cit.
supra note 3, §97. However, there are a number of jurisdictions in which this doctrine is
not followed. For a complete and exhaustive analysis of the cases by jurisdictions, see
Shield, supra note 15, at 53-120.
19. VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §42.
20. Delivery may often be constructive, and the courts have gone to great lengths
to construe such a delivery from the words and acts of the parties. See Patterson, The
Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1919) ; VANCE, op. Cit. mipra
note 3, §43; Carlton, The Delivery of Life Insurance Policies As It Affects the Inception
of Risk, [1950] LEGAL SECTION, Ami. LIFE CoNv. 7.
21. See Collier, Tort Liability for Negligent Delay in Acting on Applications, [19481
LEGAL SECTION, Am. LIFE CONy. 10; Kessler Contracts of Adhesion--Sotie Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COL. L. REV. 629, 635-637 (1943) ; Prosser, Delay in Act-
ing on An Application for lnsurance, 3 U. OF CH. L. REv. 39 (1935).
22. See Kessler, supra note 21, at 634.
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courts have reached conflicting results.2" Whether or not such a receipt is
in fact binding may be subject to conjecture in each case.
In each of these areas the pattern is similar. Either the application
of strict contract law to the policy in question results in decisions harsh
for the insured, or the courts attempt to avoid this difficulty by torturing
or partially abandoning contract law.2"
The basic cause of conflict lies in the fact that the purchase of in-
surance differs from the making of an ordinary contract. Insurance
policy terms are, for the most part, not subject to negotiation. Although
there are some differences in policy forms among the insurers and within
an individual company, basic provisions do not vary substantially. These
policies are prime examples of standardized contracts25 to which the
insured, if he desires protection,26 must adhere.27
However, even if the bargaining position of prospective purchasers
was such that they could negotiate for the terms of the policy, few would
23. Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 180 (1938); Com-
ment, supra note 14.
24. ". . . [M]any courts have shown a remarkable skill in reaching 'just' decisions
by constructing ambiguous clauses against their author even in cases where there was no
ambiguity." Kessler, supra note 21, at 633. Professor Patterson has stated: "The
general law of contracts has been warped almost beyond recognition in applying it to in-
surance controversies." PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 44 (1935).
25. "Such contracts [life insurance] do not truly express an agreement at which the
parties have arrived by mutual participation in determining all the terms and conditions
of their contract. Most of the contractual terms are already fixed in advance by one of
the parties, the insurer . . . leaving nothing to the party of the second part, the insured,
except to 'adhere' to terms he cannot change, if he chooses to accept them." Carlton, supra
note 20, at 11. See also AMRHEIN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 71-72; VANCE, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§41, 44; Kessler, supra note 21; Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance
Contract; A Few Suggestions for Further Study, 15 LAW & CoNTmip. PROB. 376 (1950X
For discussions of standardized contracts in general, see Cohen, The Basis of Con-
tract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1933) ; Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.f.
34 (1917); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939).
For a discussion of English and Continental standardized contracts, see PRAUSNITZ,
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW
(1937).
However, for a contrary view as to the nature and effect of the present life insurance
contract, see Dawson, A Few Simple Rides of Contract Law and Their Application to
Life Insurance Contracts, 2 Joun. Abi. Soc. C.L.U. 325, 331 (1948) ; Eiber, The Signifi-
cance of Standardized Mass Contracts in Insurance, 6 JouR. AaI. Soc. C.L.U. 84, 85
(1951).
26. "8tandard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a posi-
tion to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses.
His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by
the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way,
if at all. Thus, standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion; they are a
prendre ou a laisser." Kessler, supra note 21, at 632.
27. The term contract of adhesion was first used as applying to American insurance
contracts by Professor Patterson. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy,
33 HARv. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919).
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have the ability. The modern insurance contract is so complex and dif-
ficult to understand that the ordinary buyer is, due to lack of technical
knowledge, largely unable to discriminate between provisions more or
less favorable to himself. 8 He usually fails to read the policy and relies
on the agent or the company to provide him with adequate insurance. 9 As
a result, the insured does not have knowledge of either the extent of pro-
tection granted under the policy or of the duties and liabilities which
he has assumed."0
In light of this situation, the problems that arise would seem to be
expected in the logical course of events. When strict contract law is
applied to policies standardized by the companies, the provisions of which
are practically unknown to the insured, harsh results often occur. The
insured or his beneficiary then finds himself without the protection that
he thought he had purchased. Or, in the alternative, the courts have
stretched contract law to the point of abandoning it in order to reach
equitable conclusions. Both results are undesirable."'
If, then, existing contract law as applied to present company standard-
ized contracts produces undesirable results, there are two methods which
may be considered as possible remedies: changing the law applicable to
the policy or altering the contract itself. Both have the common goal of
modifying the present relationship between company and insured.
28. This is the main reason that competition among the companies has not solved
the problem. As Professor Patterson has stated: ". . . [C]ompetition assumes that
the purchaser is able and willing to discriminate between the articles offered by different
competitors, and that is just what the purchasers of insurance could not or would not do."
PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES, 246 (1927).
See also Shaver, Pitfalls in, Insuranwe Policies, [1950] INS. L.J. 801, 802.
29. "The prevailing business custom is for the insured to rely upon the accuracy,
skill, and good faith of the person who acts for the insurer in filling out the application,
delivering the policy, and collecting the premium." VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §44.
30. See Shaver, supra note 28, at 803.
However, the insured is usually held to a duty to read his policy and is charged with
knowledge of its contents. See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §44 n.27; Spain, The Effect
of the Failure of the Insured to Read His Policy, [1948] LEGAL SECTION, Am. LIFE CoNy.
109.
31. It is clear that a situation in which certain persons are without insurance pro-
tection, after having relied on it, is both socially and economically undesirable.
In regard to attempting to alleviate this difficulty by judicial construction, Professor
Llewellyn has said: "A court can 'construe' language into patently not meaning what
the language is patently trying to say. It can find inconsistencies between clauses and
throw out the troublesome ones. . . . The difficulty with these techniques of ours is
threefold. First, since they all rest on the admission that the clauses in question are
permissable in purpose and content, they invite the draftsman to recur to the attack. Give
him time, and he will make the grade. Second, since they do not face the issue, they fail
to accumulate either experience or authority in the needed direction: that of marking out
for any given type of transaction what the minimum decencies are which a court will in-
sist upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type. . . . Third, . . . they
seriously embarrass later efforts at true construction ... " Llewellyn, supra note 25, at
702-3.
NOTES
It has been suggested that contract law should no longer govern the
relationship of the parties to an insurance policy. 2 The assumption is
thus made that by changing the applicable law the harsh results of an un-
equal contract may be mitigated. This method, when carried to its logical
conclusion, would transform the relationship between the parties to one
of status rather than contract.3" The insured and the company would,
then, each be bound by a body of rules constituting the insurance arrange-
ment to which each party had impliedly assented-the one by purchasing
insurance, the other by selling protection.
The other method, that of modifying the contract through govern-
mental regulation, accompanied by a few alterations in the law, would
primarily seek to alleviate the problem by assuring that the policy is a fair
agreement from its inception. Thus, when the usual contract rules are
applied to such a policy, the results should be equitable. By standardiza-
tion through governmental action, the effects of unequal skill, knowledge,
and bargaining power between the parties are counterbalanced by public
supervision, thus creating a new relationship between the parties. This is
predicated on the assumptions that fault lies in the present policy and
that contract law is a necessary and useful part of this relationship.
At the present time, it would appear that both of these methods are
being utilized to a limited extent in the field of life insurance. Most states
require that certain standard provisions be inserted in all life insurance
policies.3" Although confined to limited areas, the effect of these re-
32. For example, Note, 35 YALE LJ. 203 (1925), suggests that the implied warranty
of commercial law be applied to insurancd contracts. It is maintained that an implied
warranty of fitness for use would do away with the necessity of courts employing "con-
clusive presumptions" and others construing contracts against the insurance company in
order to do justice to the insured.
See also Pfeister v. The Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 85 Kan. 97, 101, 116 PFac.
245, 247 (1911) ; Kessler, supra note 21, at 637-9; Patterson, supra note 27, at 216.
33. A relationship determined by status may be contrasted to a contractual agree-
ment in that in the former the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties arise not through
negotiation but rather because of the nature of the relationship itself. Status thus means
that the parties by assuming a certain relationship have also incurred certain duties and
liabilities which are deemed essential to it, although neither party may have actually ac-
cepted or bargained for them. A contractual relationship, on the other hand, implies
that the parties have bargained and negotiated for each right, duty, or liability con-
stituting the agreement.
For a discussion of the present trends and problems concerning status and contract,
see Cohen, supra note 25; Issacs, supra note 25.
34. See, for example, NEw YORK INSURANcE LAW §155. This Section provides for
ten provisions which must be inserted, to the extent that they are applicable, in each
policy that is issued. They need only be substantially complied with, and the insurer
may issue a policy which is more favorable to the insured. Each policy form must be
approved by the state insurance commissioner.
In brief, the statute requires: 1) grace period; 2) incontestable clause; 3) policy to
constitute the entire contract; 4) misstatement of age provision; 5) participating policies
to participate in the surplus annually; 6) cash surrender specified; 7) loans and loan
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quirements has been to liberalize the contract in favor of the insured.
However, at the same time, because these standard provisions do not
completely eliminate the inequalities existing between the parties, courts
still distort contract law to obtain desirable results. They are in effect
applying a new body of law to insurance policies. By disregarding the
terms of the contract in order to allow recovery, courts are actually mak-
ing the relationship between insured and insurer one of status rather than
contract.35 However, this is being done in a haphazard way, and the
result is confusion. On one side the contract is being modified in favor
of the insured by governmental regulation; on the other the courts may
refuse to apply contract law to interpret the policy.
It is not enough to say in justification of this practice that both
methods are designed to accomplish the same goal-achieve desirable
results when applying the law to the existing policy. This position ignores
the fact that the two methods, although similar in this respect, have widely
varying secondary ramifications.
To reason that strict contract law should not apply to insurance
policies since harsh results often accrue fails to recognize that the problem
is basically one of inequalities in the company-standardized contract which
the law, when applied, merely emphasizes rather than creates. Removal
of insurance policies from this law and attempted substitution of new
rules of relationship derived from the proposition that the parties have
assumed a certain status invites and creates new problems. Of what
should this status consist? So long as the courts determine it, they may
only occasionally depart from contract law. But should the legislature
attempt to remove insurance from this jurisprudence, the problems would
be immense. It would be impossible to determine legislatively an adequate
status between insurer and insured without turning back to contractual
tenets.36
Governmental standardization of policies is far more consistent with
the real problem and much more likely to reach desired results without
accompanying ill effects. Standardized contracts in themselves are not
bad. They are beneficial to both the insurer and the insured when they
values; 8) specification of the options in event of default in premium payment after
three years; 9) installmerit table; 10) reinstatement clause. See also IND. ANN. STAT.
§§39-4206a, 39-4206b (Burns Repl. 1952).
35. "In dealing with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the
weaker contracting party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the
enterpriser's 'calling,' and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable ex-
pectations based on the typical life situation." Kessler, supra note 21, at 637.
36. Legislative prescription of such a status would appear to be dependent on relat-
ing it to some presently existing body of law since it would be impossible to provide in
advance for eaclh type of situation that might arise.
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represent a fair relationship between the parties. 7 It is only when the
contract has been standardized to embody the best interests of only one
of the parties, such as prevails now, that difficulties arise. A revision
is then necessary to express a relationship which might have resulted had
they possessed equal skill and bargaining power. Since the policyholder
does not now possess this equality or skill, and it is not conceivable that
he ever will, the government must represent his and the general public's
interest by a statutorily standardized contract.
This form of governmental intervention is not inimical to freedom
of contract." With policies at present subject to company standardiza-
tion, it would be unrealistic to contend that governmentally standardized
requirements represent a destruction of such freedom. It does not now
exist under company control; consequently, the entrance of the public
interest through the medium of legislation is only the logical step to
balance the relationship."
Furthermore, insurance contracts are already subject to governmental
regulation. This varies from the completely standardized policy of fire
insurance4" to the very limited requirements of the uniform health and
37. "The legitimate interests of both the public and the insurance industry are served
by a high degree of uniformity among insurance policies. The industry, with its mass
production of policies, cannot afford the luxury of extensive bargaining with each in-
dividual policyholder; rational conduct of its business requires a wide range of uniform-
ity. . . But standardization means more than uniformity among policies issued by the
same company. It means, ideally, uniformity of the product irrespective of the pro-
ducer....
"To the policyholder uniformity means a cheapening of costs, fair and equal treat-
ment and the setting up of proper classifications without endangering the safety of the
scheme." Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, [1954] INs. LJ. 151, 156.
38. "The notion that standardization is necessarily inimical to real freedom is a fal-
lacy of the same type as the one that habits are necessarily hindrances to the achievements
of our desires. There is doubtless the real possibility of developing bad social customs, as
we develop bad individual habits. But in the main, customs and habits are necessary ways
through which our aims can be realized. By standardizing contracts, the law increases
that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative and the assumption of tolerable
risks." Cohen, supra note 25, at 588.
39. ". . . [F]reedom of contract must mean different things for different types of
contracts. Its meaning must change with the social importance of the type of contract
and with the degree of monopoly enjoyed by the author of the standardized contract."
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoL. L.
REv. 629, 642 (1943).
40. In 1873 agitation for reform resulted in the adoption by statute of a standard
fire policy in Massachusetts. Mass. Laws 1873, c. 331, §§1, 2. However, the use of the
policy by the underwriters was not mandatory and few were written under the statute.
Following this, in 1886, New York adopted a standard form which was drafted by the
New York Board of Fire Underwriters and adopted by the legislature. N.Y. Laws 1886,
c. 488. Neither the policyholders nor the insurance department of the state had any
representation or voice in the preparation of the form, and for this reason the main result
of the standard policy was to codify its provisions in favor of the insurer. See O'Neil v.
American Fire Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72, 74, 30 Ati. 943, 945 (1895), for a judicial
criticism of Pennsylvania's standard policy patterned after the New York form. How-
ever, the standard contract- did to a great extent mitigate the previously confusing situa-
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accident provisions law." In the field of life insurance, standardization
is at present limited to a few items ;42 they have been entirely satisfactory
in the areas in which employed. 3 Their chief weakness is that they have
restricted application.
It is possible to extend these standard requirements to embrace all of
the major controversial aspects of the life policy without making it un-
adaptable to various conditions. Criticism of the statutory policy stems
from its failure to allow for expansion of coverage or addition of provi-
sions. Statutes requiring that certain clauses be inserted in the policy
tion caused by the use of many varied forms.
After being in use for over a quarter of a century, the 1873 form became obsolete.
Inequities resulting from its use became apparent and led to demands for revision. Thus,
in 1918, a new form was adopted which, although like its predecessor was still balanced in
favor of the insurer, was a substantial improvement over the 1873 provisions. N.Y. Laws
1917, c. 440.
Finally, in 1943, demands for a more simplified and modernized contract, resulted in
the adoption of the 1943 New York Standard Fire Policy which is widely used today.
N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 671; N.Y. INs. LAw §168. This form is a great improvement over all
previous attempts at fire policy standardization and has resulted in simplified interpreta-
tion and greater protection for the insured.
For analysis of the 1943 form, see HEDGES, PRACTICAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INSUR-
ANCE 63-64 (5th ed. 1951) ; Chrichton, The Statutory Fire Insurance Policy, [1951] INS.
L.J. 785; Patterson, Insurance Duringi the War Years, 46 COL. L. REV. 345 (1946) ; Note,
42 COL. L. REV. 1227 (1942).
41. The Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law was
adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in 1950. See Van
Wilhite, The New Policy Provisions Law, [1951] INS. L.J. 963; Cover, Consideration of
Legal Problems Presented When a Legal Reserve Life Insurance Company Enters the
Accident and Health Field, 9 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. COUNSEL 157, 179 (1952).
42. See note 34 supra for an analysis of the present New York requirements.
Statutes specifying completely standardized policies of life insurance, by enactment
of the entire policy, have been attempted and subsequently repealed. New York enacted
such policies in 1906. N.Y. Laws 1906, c. 326, §101. Their adoption came about largely
as a result of the Armstrong investigation and the recommendations of that committee.
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES, Vol. 10,
439 (1905). However, the law was early held by the attorney general to apply only to
the intrastate business of domestic companies, leaving foreign insurers free to write any
type of policy in New York. Moreover, the contract forms were felt to be too inflexible.
See Appleton, Wherein Have Insurance Conditions Improved During the Past Twenty
Years in the Field of Life Insurance, 46 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L CONVENTION INS. COMM'RS
97-98 (1915). The provision prescribing standard policy forms was repealed in 1909, be-
ing replaced by a requirement that each contract must contain certain specified clauses,
the form not being prescribed. N.Y. Laws 1909, c. 301, §7.
A few other states have adopted standard life policy forms, but their use is not com-
pulsory. See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3, §7, n.19.
Life insurance must fit many needs and flexibility is of prime importance. See
HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 13-82 (4th ed. 1950). Enactment of the policy was not able
to accomplish this. However, this does not indicate that life insurance cannot benefit
from increased governmental standardization.
43. "The insurance laws which are designed to regulate the terms of life insurance
policies have had a very salutory effect in accomplishing their objective of assuring that
the policyholder shall receive a fair contract. Such laws are also beneficial to insurers
who are interested in maintaining high standards and who value the resulting good will."
KRUEGER, op. cit. supra note 16, §19.11.
NOTES
merely establish the minimum standard requirements for insurance pro-
tection. The underwriter may revise his policy to include new coverage
and modifications as the needs of the business might demand as long as
certain requisites of both inclusion and exclusion are met. Many of these
desirable provisions can be found in some of the better policies now
being written.
These standard clauses should be drafted with one basic goal in
mind: granting the most adequate insurance protection consistent with
the continued advancement of the insurance industry. These statutes
should follow the present method of prohibiting certain provisions as well
as requiring others. For example, exclusion clauses in so far as possible
should be eliminated, and those that are retained should be incorporated in
the name of the policy or otherwise stated in a prominent place on its face.
Binding receipts should be of the satisfaction type,4 and use of the
acceptance type should be prohibited."5 The doctrines of fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment as applied in insurance law should be
reexamined to determine their necessity."'
With extension of standard clauses to other provisions of the life
policy, the courts should abandon the practice of twisting and departing
from contract law by strained constructions in favor of the insuredIT
The standard life insurance policy, if it represents a fair and equitable
agreement between the parties, would result in a minimum of harsh deci-
sions for the insured. Courts should recognize that the standard insurance
policy is no longer the creation of the company and, thus, must be con-
strued according to its terms rather than in either party's favor. Un-
fortunately, the latter practice still prevails in the interpretation of the
completely standardized fire policy." Possibly the addition of the life
policy to the group of more stringently regulated insurance contracts will
hasten judicial recognition of the fact that when the reason for such a
44. Under this type of receipt, coverage commences the moment the premium is
paid provided that the applicant is insurable according to the company's general regula-
tions. Therefore, the insured and his beneficiaries would be protected whether or not the
company "accepts" the application or "delivers" the policy. See Comment, supra note 14,
at 536.
45. The approval type of receipt provides that if, prior to the insured's death, the
application is approved by the company, coverage would commence from the date of ap-
plication. However, the dangers inherent in this form are readily apparent; coverage
depends not upon any act of the insured which he may control but upon "approval" of his
application by the company.
46. Concealment as presently applied in insurance law should be discarded and the
ordinary contract definition adopted. See Harnett, supra note 9, at 413.
47. See Kuvin, Woudd a Uniform intsurance Law or Code be Advisable?, [1953] INs.
LJ. 422; Mooney, Construction of the Life Policy, [1952] INs. L.J. 200.
48. See 1 JoYcE ON INSURANCE 546-547 (2d ed. 1917) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 3,
§136; Kuvin, supra note 47, at 426.
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practice is removed, the practice itself should be discontinued. If this
happens, insurance law would become a predictable body of jurisprudence.
Since the decision in the South Ea&tern Underwriter's Case,49 federal
control of insurance has been a real possibility."0 However, standard
provisions for life contracts could be promulgated under state supervision
in a manner similar to the adoption of the standard fire policy.5 Through
this means substantial uniformity would be achieved without the dis-
advantages of centralized control in which it is difficult to consider or
provide for local differences.52
These proposals are obviously not, nor are they intended to be, a
panacea for the present or future ills of the life insurance industry. Such
a program is not opposed to the best interests of the majority of present
day companies, which are attempting to write a more than acceptable
policy. It should rather act as a deterrent to those few companies which
are less public spirited than their brethern and a stimulant to those com-
panies who correlate the best interests of the insurance industry with the
best interests of the public.
49. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
50. See Leslie, The Case for State Regulation of Insurance, PROCEEDINGS OF AM.
BAR. Ass'N, SEC. oF INS. LAW 188 (Sept. 17-19, 1951).
51. Probably the group most qualified to examine present conditions and determine
the substantive requirements of further standard provisions would be the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners. Their knowledge of the field could be supple-
mented by other experts in insurance. At the same time representatives of the insurance
industry should have an opportunity to be heard on all issues.
See Martin, The National Association of Insurance Commissioners and State Insur-
ance Department Functions, [19521 INs. L.J. 583.
52. For a discussion of relative advantages and disadvantages of state and federal
control, see HuEBNER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 484-486.
For the position advocating state control, see Leslie, supra note 50; Lincoln, Insurance
Supervision, LIFE INSURANCE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS 33-34 (McCohan ed. 1943).
